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We are more than a little bit surprised at the seeming reticence of the central bank's 
governor, Mr Derrick Latibeaudiere, to the idea of a monetary policy committee, 
being proposed by the private sector. 
The suggestion forms part of the package of proposals of the so-called Partners for 
Progress group, who have been seeking a framework for sustained growth in the 
Jamaican economy. 
This group has not only been talking. They have been prepared to back the strength 
of their convictions with substantial action. 
Indeed, they have been attempting to convince domestic financial institutions to 
convert high-cost Jamaican dollar loans to other forms of debt instruments that 
would ease the short-term interest burden and provide an opportunity for the 
Government to begin to seriously address the public sector deficit. 
Reasonably, those who are putting together this programme want to be assured that 
the administration establishes the environment in which concessions made by the 
private sector translate into real macro-economic value. One way to help ensure 
this is through transparency in policy formulation. 
A monetary policy committee is but one instrument, so far as the partners are 
concerned, to add value to the idea. 
Mr Latibeaudiere's reservation, it seems, rests on his argument that such 
committees usually operate in the context of independent central banks, which are 
removed from direct political control and which have control over monetary policy  




Indeed, this newspaper supports the idea of an independent central bank, whose 
principal officers are removed from the whim of political control and have the 
authority, under law, to limit lending to the government. 
This is an ideal for which we must strive - the sooner the better. 
However, we do not see an independent central bank and a monetary policy 
committee in the context of the existing structure of the Bank of Jamaica as 
mutually exclusive. 
The truth be told, senior officials who speak of the operation of the BOJ often hail 
its relative independence and the creative tension which usually exists between the 
central bank and the finance ministry. In fact, there is a healthy bit of chest-
thumping at Nethersole Place. 
In any event, we would have thought that in the absence of its independence, a 
monetary policy committee, involving key economic players, would be a 
development welcomed by the central bank and its top managers. Such a 
committee would, on the face of it, provide the central bank with some level of 
insulation from political controllers or politicised and over-reaching bureaucrats at 
the finance ministry. 
Indeed, the timely publication of the minutes of the meeting on which the decisions 
of the committee were made would provide powerful moral authority against a 
Government that was intent on running roughshod over the wishes of the 
committee. We, for instance, would like to know the thinking, and technical  
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arguments, behind the decision in the first quarter of last year to push interest rates 
well beyond 30 per cent to defend the Jamaican dollar. It would be interesting to 
know what was the stance of the professional central bankers on offering investors 
such high levels of real return on their money. 
The fundamental argument is that better decisions are likely to be made in an 
environment of openness and transparency and on the basis of access to other than 
a narrow slate of views. 
Moreover, the kind of committee which is being proposed could well be a 
fundamental first step to an independent central bank. 
Jamaica Observer Editorial, Sunday February 21, 2004 
 
 
The government's ability to credibly commit to policy announcements is critical 
to the successful implementation of economic policies as diverse as capital 
taxation and utilities regulation. One frequently advocated means of signaling 
credible commitment is to delegate authority to an agency that will not have an 
incentive to opportunistically change policies once the private sector has taken 
such steps as signing wage contracts or making irreversible investments￿￿ 
Delegating authority is suggested as a government strategy particularly for 
monetary policy. And existing work on the independence of central banks 
generally assumes that government decisions to delegate are irrevocable. But 
delegation - in monetary policy as elsewhere - is inevitably a political choice, and 
can be reversed￿. 
 
David Stasavage, Philip Keefer  
GLOBAL THINKING RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 
7
Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions: When Are Independent 
Central Banks Irrelevant? 
 
Under the arrangements for the Euro, monetary policy will be controlled by the 
European Central Bank (ECB). Many of the objections to this arrangement are 
well-known and often rehearsed. However, one of the strongest arguments in 
favour of doing things this way is only rarely debated, and is almost never 
countered directly. This is the argument that the Euro is good because it means 
there will be a central bank which is totally outside political control, indeed so far 
outside political control that for all but one country it is not even located on 
national territory. 
Whether the ECB will really be independent of political control is, of course, a 
contentious question. I shall not discuss it here. I want to assume that it is 
independent and to discuss whether that will be a good thing. Clearly this 
discussion will also have a bearing on whether arrangements like those of the 
Bundesbank or the Bank of England are a good idea. My argument will imply that 
they are not￿. 
Andrew Lilico  




￿..As monetary policy is handled by an independent authority, fiscal and 
wage/social protection policies remain an instrument in the hands of national 
governments. We find that so long as the two authorities pursue their goals 
independently of each other, a conflict arises which is exacerbated as preferences 
diverge. Further to that we find that the establishment of a conservative Central 
Bank encourages more left-wing preferences amongst the public (as reflected in  
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the governments they elect). And the election of more left-wing governments 
makes it more difficult for each authority to reach their own preferred objectives, 
unless they are able to cooperate￿ 
 
Maria Demertzis and Andrew Hughes Hallett  
Centre for Economic Policy Research,London 





When Are Independent Central Banks Irrelevant
1? 
 
The government's ability to credibly commit to policy announcements is critical 
to the successful implementation of economic policies as diverse as capital 
taxation and utilities regulation. (David Stasavage and Philip Keefer 2000). 
 One frequently advocated means of signaling credible commitment is to 
delegate authority to an agency that will not have an incentive to 
opportunistically change policies once the private sector has taken such steps as 
signing wage contracts or making irreversible investments.  
                                                 
1 Keefer, Philip, Stasavage, David, Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions, World Bank 2000 
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Delegating authority is suggested as a government strategy particularly for 
monetary policy. And existing work on the independence of central banks 
generally assumes that government decisions to delegate are irrevocable. But 
delegation - in monetary policy as elsewhere - is inevitably a political choice, 
and can be reversed, contend Keefer and Stasavage.  
They develop a model of monetary policy that relaxes the assumption that 
monetary delegation is irreversible. Among the testable predictions of the model 
are these:  
• The presence of an independent central bank should reduce inflation only in 
the presence of political checks and balances. This effect should be evident in 
both developing and industrial countries.  
• Political actions to interfere with the central bank should be more apparent 
when there are few checks and balances.  
• The effects of checks and balances should be more marked when political 
decision makers are more polarized.  
The authors test these predictions and find extensive empirical evidence to 
support each of the observable implications of their model: Central banks are 
associated with better inflation outcomes in the presence of checks and balances. 
The turnover of central bank governors is reduced when governors have tenure 
protections supported by political checks and balances. And the effect of checks 
and balances is enhanced in more polarized political environments.  
  
GLOBAL THINKING RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 
10
Should Financial Sector Regulators Be Independent
2? 
 
Should Financial Sector Regulators Be Independent?  
In nearly every major financial crisis of the past decade￿from East Asia to Russia, 
Turkey, and Latin America￿political interference in financial sector regulation 
helped make a bad situation worse. Political pressures not only weakened financial 
regulation generally, they also hindered regulators and the supervisors who enforce 
the regulations from taking action against banks that ran into trouble. In so doing, 
they crippled the financial sector in the run-up to the crisis, delayed recognition of 
the severity of the crisis, slowed needed intervention, and raised the cost of the 
crisis to taxpayers.  
Increasingly, both policymakers and policy analysts are recognizing the need to 
shield financial sector regulators from political pressure to improve the quality of 
regulation and supervision with the ultimate goal of preventing financial crises. 
Surprisingly, however, few analyses have systematically discussed why 
independence for the financial regulatory agency might be desirable and how it 
might best be achieved.  
This document investigates why financial sector regulators and supervisors might 
need a substantial degree of independence￿not only from the government but also 
from the financial services industry￿to fulfill their mandate to achieve and 
preserve financial sector stability. It also looks at the need for keeping regulators 
accountable as they exercise the (often) far-reaching powers delegated to them by 
their government.  
                                                 
2 Quintyn, Marc, Taylor, Michael W., Should Financial Sector Regulators Be Independent?, IMF 2004  
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Rationale for regulation  
Regulators and supervisors in nations around the world are charged with managing 
the health of banks and other financial institutions and preserving the stability of 
the financial system. Governments regulate financial institutions for two main 
purposes. The first is consumer protection. This is much the same reason they 
regulate public utilities and telecommunications: to provide a framework of rules 
that can help prevent the excesses and failures of a market left entirely to its own 
devices. Second, regulation in the financial sector has the additional goal of 
maintaining financial stability, a clear public good that justifies a more elaborate 
framework of regulation and supervision.  
Financial sector supervision, in particular, is more rigorous and intensive than 
supervision in other regulated sectors. Banking supervisors engage not only in off-
site analysis of banks' performance but also in extensive on-site inspections, and 
they intensify their monitoring and may intervene when banks fail to meet 
minimum requirements designed to ensure their financial soundness. Supervisors 
can even, in extreme cases, take ownership rights away from the owners of failed 
or failing financial institutions.  
Banking regulation developed out of the concern of central banks to ensure 
financial stability. In many parts of the world, the central bank is the agency 
responsible for regulating banks, while, in others, it is a separate agency. In the 
nonbank financial sector, such as securities markets, insurance, and pensions, 
regulation has usually been conducted either by a central government ministry or 
by a specialist agency answerable to a ministry. The need for independent 
regulatory agencies has not, however, featured very strongly in public debates. In 
recent years, this has begun to change, driven by two important reasons.   
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Lack of independence worsens financial crises  
In many of the world's recent financial crises, policymakers in the countries 
affected have sought to intervene in the work of regulators￿often with disastrous 
results. It is now increasingly recognized that political meddling has consistently 
caused or worsened financial instability.  
In her account of the Venezuelan banking crisis of 1994, former central bank 
president Ruth de Krivoy cited ineffective regulation, weak supervision, and 
political interference as factors weakening the banks in the period leading up to the 
crisis. In her book, Collapse, published in 2000, de Krivoy emphasized the need 
for lawmakers to "make bank supervisors strong and independent, and give them 
enough political support to allow them to perform their duties."  
In East Asia in 199798, political interference in the regulatory and supervisory 
process postponed recognition of the severity of the crisis, delayed action, and, 
ultimately, deepened the crisis. In Korea, for example, a lack of independence 
impeded supervision. While the country's commercial banks were under the 
authority of the central bank (the Bank of Korea) and the Office of Banking 
Supervision, Korea's specialized banks and nonbank financial institutions were 
regulated by the ministry of finance and economy. The ministry's weak supervision 
encouraged excessive risk taking by the nonbanks, which helped lead to the 1997 
crisis. Korea subsequently reformed its supervisory system, both to give it more 
autonomy and to eliminate the regulatory and supervisory gaps.  
In Indonesia, banking sector weaknesses stemmed from poorly enforced 
regulations and from supervisors' reluctance to take action against politically well 
connected banks, especially those linked to the Suharto family. When the crisis hit, 
central bank procedures for dispensing liquidity support to troubled banks were  
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overridden, it has been claimed, on the direct instructions of the president. Even 
after Suharto's fall, political interference continued in the bank restructuring effort. 
Indonesia's Financial Sector Action Committee, which was composed of several 
heads of economic ministries and chaired by the coordinating minister, intervened 
intrusively in the work of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency and 
undermined the credibility of the agency's restructuring effort.  
The lack of independence of financial supervisors in Japan's ministry of finance 
weakened the Japanese financial sector and contributed to prolonged banking 
sector problems. Although there was probably little direct political pressure on the 
ministry to allow weak banks to continue operating, the system lacked 
transparency, and implicit government guarantees of banking sector liabilities were 
understood to be widespread. Following a decline in the ministry's reputation in the 
late 1990s, the Japanese government created a new Financial Services Agency to 
oversee banking, insurance, and the securities markets, in part as an attempt to 
improve the independence of supervision.  
The example of central bank independence  
A second development that has encouraged interest in regulatory independence is 
the success achieved by independent central banks in fighting inflation. Since the 
late 1980s, more and more countries have freed their central banks from political 
control because evidence was growing that independent central banks had a 
successful record of achieving monetary stability￿in other words, controlling 
inflation. Central bank independence is seen as essential to counter the natural 
preference of politicians for expansionary economic policies that promise short-
term electoral gains at the risk of worsening inflation in the long run. Making  
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central banks independent frees them from political pressure and thus removes the 
inflationary bias that could otherwise unsettle monetary policy.  
The incentives for politicians to rescue failing banks are similar to those for 
inaction in the face of inflation. The decision to close a failing bank is usually 
unpopular. Politicians eager to avoid a necessary closure may be tempted to 
pressure bank supervisors to organize a bailout or to excuse the failing bank from 
regulatory requirements, even at the risk of worsening the problem and increasing 
the long-term costs of resolving it. This similarity strengthens the case for 
regulatory and supervisory independence in the financial sector. Bank regulatory 
independence is to financial stability what central bank independence is to 
monetary stability, and the independence of the two agencies can be mutually 
reinforcing. Both agencies also provide a public good￿financial stability￿which 
sets them apart from other sector-specific regulatory agencies.  
Still, banking supervisory authorities differ from central bank authorities in one 
important way. When banking supervisors revoke a failing bank's license, they are 
using the coercive power of the state against private citizens. When central banks 
conduct monetary policy, they have no such coercive power. However, the unique 
power enjoyed by financial regulators should not be used as an argument against 
granting them independence. Instead, governments should fully accept and take the 
implications of that power into account￿both by establishing strong accountability 
mechanisms to prevent abuse and by recognizing the need to employ highly 
qualified supervisors of demonstrable integrity and to pay them adequately.  
Potential problems with agency independence 
Growing recognition of these factors, together with a growing trend toward the 
creation of "integrated" financial supervisory agencies that regulate banks,  
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securities markets, and insurance companies￿which forces policymakers and 
legislators to rethink institutional arrangements￿has focused attention on the case 
for agency independence. Increasingly, a consensus is forming that regulatory and 
supervisory agencies should be independent￿that they should not be embedded in 
the executive hierarchy and thus subject to political pressure. In theory, 
independent regulators can decide on and conduct market interventions shielded 
from political interference and improve regulatory and supervisory transparency, 
stability, and expertise. And, indeed, growing evidence suggests that independent 
regulators have made regulation more effective, have led to smoother and more 
efficient operation of the market, and are a distinct improvement over regulatory 
functions located in government ministries.  
But independent regulatory agencies have potential problems of their own. As the 
Nobel Prizewinning economist George J. Stigler pointed out in a seminal article in 
1971, agencies tend to respond to the wishes of the best-organized interest groups. 
When regulators are free from political control, the risk of "regulatory capture" by 
other groups￿in particular, the industry they regulate￿grows. Agencies that 
suffer from such capture come to identify industry interests (or even the interests of 
individual firms) with the public interest. And industry capture can undermine the 
effectiveness of regulation just as political pressure can. Regulators may, for 
example, formulate rules so as to minimize industry costs rather than strike an 
appropriate balance between those costs and public benefits. They may also apply 
rules inconsistently and exempt individual firms from regulatory requirements.  
Agency independence entails another important concern, namely, the need for 
accountability. An independent agency might pursue an agenda of its own, going 
against the wishes of the political majority. Some worried analysts have branded 
independent regulatory agencies the "fourth branch of government," implying that  
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they are outside the control of the traditional three branches that keep mature 
democratic systems in equilibrium through a system of checks and balances. 
Although such fears appear to be exaggerated, they nevertheless demonstrate the 
need for proper forms of accountability to balance the advantages of agency 
independence with the disadvantages.  
Achieving both political independence and independence from the regulated 
industry, as well as accountability, is essential. Political independence, however, 
remains the prime concern from the point of view of financial stability, given the 
vested interests that many national governments still have in the banking system, 
and, therefore, in bank regulation and supervision, as well as the dismal track 
record of political interference in regulatory and supervisory arrangements.  
Four dimensions of independence 
In passing the laws that create regulatory agencies, politicians properly set and 
define regulatory and supervisory goals. But once those laws are in force, 
regulators must be free to determine how to achieve these goals￿and should be 
held accountable if they fail to achieve them. Independence has four dimensions: 
regulatory, supervisory, institutional, and budgetary.  
Regulatory independence in the financial sector means that regulators have wide 
autonomy in setting, at a minimum, prudential rules and regulations that follow 
from the special nature of financial intermediation. These rules and regulations 
concern the practices that financial institutions must adopt to maintain their safety 
and stability, including minimum capital adequacy ratios, exposure limits, and loan 
provisioning. Regulators who are able to set these rules independently are more 
likely to be motivated to enforce them. They are also able to adapt the rules  
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quickly and flexibly in response to changing conditions in the global marketplace 
without having to go through a lengthy, high-pressure political process.  
In some countries, the laws governing financial institutions and the financial 
regulatory agency are so detailed as to leave little room for independent rule setting 
by the supervisory agency. In others, the laws merely brush a broad framework, 
leaving much greater scope for regulatory discretion. Regardless of a country's 
particular legal traditions, however, independent regulators should be given ample 
discretion to set and change regulations within the broad confines of the country's 
constitution and banking law.  
Supervisory independence is crucial in the financial sector. It is also difficult to 
establish and guarantee. Supervisors work quite closely with financial institutions, 
not only inspecting and monitoring them but also enforcing sanctions and even 
revoking licenses. Much of their activity takes place outside direct public view, 
and interference with their work, either by politicians or by the industry, can be 
subtle and can take many forms. Steps to protect supervisors' integrity include 
offering legal protection (for example, repealing laws that, in some countries, 
allow supervisors to be sued personally for their work) and providing financial 
incentives that allow supervisory agencies to attract and keep competent staff and 
discourage bribery. Crafting a rules-based system of sanctions and interventions 
also lessens the scope for supervisory discretion￿and thus for political and 
industry interference. To protect supervisors from political or industry intimidation 
during a lengthy court process, banking law should also limit the time allowed for 
appeals by institutions facing sanction. Independent supervisors, not a government 
agency or minister, should be given sole authority to grant and withdraw licenses 
because they best understand the financial sector's proper composition￿and 
because the threat to revoke a license is a powerful supervisory tool.   
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Institutional independence, or the agency's status outside the executive and 
legislative branches of government, has three critical elements. First, senior 
personnel should enjoy security of tenure: clear rules, ideally involving two 
government bodies, must govern their appointment and, especially, dismissal. 
Second, the agency's governance structure should consist of multimember 
commissions composed of experts. And, third, decision making should be open 
and transparent to the extent consistent with commercial confidentiality, enabling 
both the public and the industry to scrutinize regulatory decisions.  
Budgetary independence depends primarily on the role of the executive or the 
legislative branch in determining the agency's budget and how it is used. 
Supervisors should not be subjected to political pressure through the budget. 
Senior personnel should have the budgetary freedom to staff the agency as they see 
fit and to respond quickly to emerging agency needs. If funding must come from 
the government budget, the supervisory budget should be proposed and justified by 
the agency itself, following objective criteria related to developments in the 
market. Some supervisory agencies are funded through industry fees, a practice 
that minimizes political interference but risks increasing dependence on￿and 
attracting interference from￿the industry. Industry fees, if used, should be 
determined jointly by the agency and the government. Also, fee-based funding may 
leave the agency strapped for funds during a crisis, because that is precisely when 
the industry is most likely to have difficulty paying the fee. Agencies should 
therefore be allowed to build up reserve funds as insurance.  
Conclusion 
The case for regulatory independence in the financial sector can be based on 
analogies with two areas where the issue of regulatory independence has already  
GLOBAL THINKING RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 
19
been largely settled: the regulation of public utilities and telecommunications, and 
the conduct of monetary policy by the central bank. Mounting evidence indicates 
that independent regulators have increased the efficiency and effectiveness of 
regulation and helped markets operate more smoothly and efficiently. And the 
concept of central bank independence has gained near-universal acceptance over 
the past two decades, as independent central banks have shown that they can 
successfully pursue monetary stability. Regulatory and supervisory independence 
in the financial sector complements central bank independence in achieving and 
preserving the twin goals of monetary and financial stability.  
Even though independent regulatory agencies have proved themselves in practice, 
creating them and keeping them independent and accountable poses difficulties 
that cannot be ignored. An agency that is independent of political control may 
become subject instead to pressure from the industry it regulates. And freedom 
from political control can lead to serious deficiencies in political accountability. 
Making financial sector regulatory independence work requires attention to all four 
aspects of independence: regulatory, supervisory, institutional, and budgetary. The 
arguments for and against jump-starting independence by housing the agency in 
the central bank need to be considered and the best course decided upon. Whether 
the country's political institutions, especially its system of checks and balances, are 
adequately developed to safeguard the agency's independence must also be 
determined. Finally, the proposed arrangements must be tested against the seven 
essential criteria laid out above to ensure the proper balance between effective 
independence and political accountability.   
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Inflation, Growth, and Central Banks: Theory and Evidence
3 
Inflation limits economic growth by reducing the efficiency of investment rather 
than its level. An effective way of achieving low inflation is to establish an 
independent central bank.  
De Gregorio reviews the theory and evidence on inflation and growth and 
provides additional empirical evidence for a large cross-section of countries.  
The evidence, he reports, suggests a robust negative relationship between 
inflation and growth. He argues that inflation limits growth mainly by reducing 
the efficiency of investment rather than its level. But this finding is difficult to 
explain using traditional theories that rely on the effects of inflation on 
employment, which are not supported by the data. Explanations focusing on the 
effects of inflation on the allocation of talents and the functioning of financial 
markets may help in understanding better the long-run relationship between 
inflation and growth.  
De Gregorio also reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on how central 
banks affect inflation and output growth. An independent central bank can be 
effective in reducing inflation if the public perceives that it is tough on inflation. 
But inflation persists because the cost of reducing it is high --- the most evident 
cost being the loss of output from disinflation.  
De Gregorio concludes that although serious progress has been made in recent 
years in assessing empirically how central banks affect macroeconomic 
performance, the results are still inconclusive. The empirical evidence shows a 
                                                 
3 Gregorio, Jose de, Inflation, Growth, and Central Banks: Theory and Evidence, World Bank 1996 
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negative correlation between inflation and central bank independence, especially 
in OECD countries, but the effects on growth are less conclusive. It is fair to say 
that the bulk of the evidence suggests that central bank independence produces 
lower inflation at no real costs.  




The literature argues that the benefits of an independent Central Bank accrue at no 
cost to the real side. In this paper, we argue that the lack of correlation between 
monetary autonomy and output variability is due to the proactive role of fiscal 
policy when faced with rigid monetary objectives. None of the attempts in the 
literature to measure these correlations allow for a changing fiscal role. As 
monetary policy is handled by an independent authority, fiscal and wage/social 
protection policies remain an instrument in the hands of national governments. We 
find that so long as the two authorities pursue their goals independently of each 
other, a conflict arises which is exacerbated as preferences diverge. Further to that 
we find that the establishment of a conservative Central Bank encourages more 
left-wing preferences amongst the public (as reflected in the governments they 
elect). And the election of more left-wing governments makes it more difficult 
for each authority to reach their own preferred objectives, unless they are 
able to cooperate. 
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Central Bank Independence and Wage Bargaining Structure - 
Empirical Evidence. 
 
This paper studies the relationship between central bank independence, wage 
bargaining structure and macroeconomic performance in OECD countries. A 
cross-sectional time-series (TSCS) model for inflation, nominal wage growth and 
unemployment for the period 1973-1996 is estimated using different and updated 
measures of central bank independence. The importance of the price stability 
objective in the central bank statute is used as a proxy for the degree of 
conservativeness of the central bank. A recently published data set on wage 
bargaining structure is used, and a distinction is made between coordination of 
wage bargaining and formal centralization. A new measure of union power is 
constructed, which combines formal centralization and union density. The 
implications of the large differences that can be seen between coverage and 
unionization rates in some countries are briefly discussed. Two important results 
emerge. First, the central bank's political independence and personnel 
independence contribute most importantly to a successful inflation policy. Second, 
a high level of coordination contributes to moderate inflation rates and 
unemployment, while union monopoly power tends to increase inflation. 
Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and 
Central Bank Design
5 
The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game 
between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government 
                                                 
5Andrew Hughes Hallett and Diana Weymark,  Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics 
and Central Bank Design,CEPR,2002 
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chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy 
are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is taken into account, 
there is a continuum of combinations of central bank independence and 
conservatism that produce optimal outcomes. This indeterminacy is resolved by 
appealing to practical considerations. In particular, it is argued that full central 





The theoretical argument for central bank independence is based on the idea that 
even if the government represents people's preferences over inflation and output it 
has an incentive to renege from prearranged plans to gain a short run boost to 
output. This incentive leads to higher than desired inflation. One solution to this 
credibility problem is to give control of monetary policy to an independent central 
bank that is more averse to inflation than society. Central bank independence thus 
reduces society's credibility problem but this may be at the expense of less flexible 
counter cyclical monetary policy. The aim of this paper is to find the correct 
balance between credibility and flexibility, ie the optimal degree of central bank 
independence. The first part of the paper sets out an open economy model and 
identifies some macroeconomic factors that influence the optimal degree of 
independence. It finds that the optimal degree of independence increases when; 1) 
the NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment). is higher, 2) the 
benefits of unanticipated inflation are greater, 3) society is less inflation-averse, 4) 
productivity shocks have smaller variance, 5) the real exchange rate has less 
variability, 6) the economy is less open. The second part of the paper estimates the 
relationship between these six factors and measures of central bank independence 
                                                 
6 Sylvester Eijffinger, Optimal Commitment in an Open Economy, Bank of England,  
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for 19 industrial countries using a latent variables estimation technique. It finds 
that, in general, the actual degree of independence is related to these six factors and 
so the institutional arrangements in most countries are close to the optimum. The 
main exceptions are Germany and Switzerland - that seem to have an excessively 
high degree of independence - and Australia, Norway, Sweden and the UK - which 
have a lower than optimal degree of independence. 
 
Unanticipated Inflation and Government Finance
7 
 
This paper discuss the merits of an independent "EuroFed" within the context of a 
tax/seigniorage smoothing model for a monetary union. There is an incentive to 
use a surprise inflation tax to wipe out the real value of government debt and wage 
contracts because this allows a cut in distortionary taxes and boost employment 
and private consumption. If dependent central banks can pre-commit, there is no 
case for an independent EuroFed as this leads to a sub-optimal government 
revenue mix. If only an independent EuroFed can guarantee sufficient discipline, 
however, a case can be made for it over and above a monetary union with a non-
cooperative or cooperative central bank. This case is stronger when the aversion to 
inflation is high, when the outstanding stock of nominal government debt is high, 
when the underground economy is insignificant and when there is little indexation. 
Even if all contracts are indexed, there is an incentive to create unanticipated 
inflation if money demand depends on expected inflation. If private agents are 
rational in their forecasts of inflation, however, government spending is financed 
through temporary bouts of taxation and inflation, and given that all contracts are 
indexed, no case for an independent central bank can be made. Competition 
between central banks of a monetary union induces excessive inflation, because 
                                                 
7 Van der Ploeg, Frederick, Unanticipated Inflation and Government Finance: The Case for an Independent 
Common Central Bank,CEPR,1991 
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each bank fails to internalize the externalities associated with appropriating too 
much seigniorage from the common central bank. 
Central Bank Independence Promotes Budgetary Efficiency
8 
 
Research shows theoretically, inefficient public expenditure can be institutionally 
curtailed by an independent central bank. An advantage of our analysis is to 
employ a two-country model with cash-in- advance constraints. The model can 
deal with fiscal policy as well as monetary policy with considering international 
interdependence. Each government decides the levels of public goods provision 
and a lump-sum tax, and each central bank chooses the quantity of money supply, 
to maximize its own households' utility. When the central bank is not independent 
of the fiscal authority, that is, when fiscal policy is determined before monetary 
policy, the public good is oversupplied. When the central bank is independent 
(monetary policy is predetermined), however, the expenditure level is efficient. 
Because the government cannot decide the provision of public good in anticipation 




Second Thoughts About Central Bank Independence
9 
 
The 2003 Institute for Fiscal Studies Lecture addressed two sets of issues relevant 
to current and prospective future EU members: the consequences of the Stability 
and Growth Pact for fiscal-financial sustainability and macroeconomic stability, 
                                                 
8 Doi, Takero, Central Bank Independence Promotes Budgetary Efficiency, Institute of Social Science, University 
Of Tokyo, 1998 
9 Buiter, Willem H, Two Naked Emperors? Concerns about the Stability and Growth Pact and Second Thoughts 
About Central Bank Independence, CEPR 2003 
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and some risks associated with operational independence of the central bank. The 
relevance of the second issue is not restricted to EU members. Poor 
communication, cooperation and coordination between the fiscal and monetary 
authorities can be costly in two contingencies. The first of these occurs when the 
central bank￿s role as the lender of last resort needs to be backed up by the 
willingness of the Treasury to recapitalize the central bank, should the need arise. 
The second contingency occurs when unwanted deflation needs to be prevented or 
combated, but the central bank￿s conventional monetary arsenal is exhausted. 
Friedman￿s helicopter drop of money, a temporary tax cut or transfer payment 
increase financed through the issuance of base money will always stimulate 
demand provided it is not expected to be reversed, in present value terms, in the 
future. In most real-world institutional/legal settings the implementation of a 
helicopter drop of base money requires coordinated actions by the central bank and 
Treasury. Central bank independence is unlikely to survive if either or both of 
these contingencies occur, if there is an ineffective response by the fiscal and 





Central bank independence has contributed to achieve price stability and fiscal 
discipline for many countries. This is an accepted first-generation reform of fiscal 
and monetary policy. The question this paper asks is whether a second-generation 
reform consisting of institutional incentives for domestic policy coordination could 
be beneficial. The paper presents a game-theoretic model where the fiscal and 
                                                 
10 H. Bennett and N. Loayza, Policy Biases when the Monetary and Fiscal Authorities have Different 
Objectives,Central Bank of Chile, 2000. 
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monetary authorities interact to stabilize the economy. These authorities are 
different in that they have dissimilar preferences with respect to output and 
inflation gaps and control different policy instruments. Modeled as Nash or 
Stackelberg equilibria, the solution under lack of policy coordination implies that 
an increase in the preference divergence between the monetary and fiscal 
authorities leads to, ceteris paribus, larger public deficits (the fiscal authority's 
policy instrument) and higher interest rates (the central bank's instrument). The 
empirical section of the paper tests this conclusion on a pooled  
 
 
sample of 19 industrial countries with annual information for the period 1970-94. 
Controlling for other shocks and economic conditions, the estimation results 
support the main conclusion of the theoretical section. The policy implication of 
the paper is that, without prejudice to the gains from central bank independence, 
institutional arrangements that allow for coordination both at the level of setting 
objectives and at the level of policy implementation can alleviate the biases that 




We have exposed you to numerous views for and against the case for an 
Independent Central Bank. 
 
In summary, we draw the following conclusions: 
 
There are two (2) strong arguments FOR an Independent Central Bank 
1) That they imply lower inflation in theory;  
2) And that countries with independent central banks have exhibited lower 
inflation in practice.   
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There are four (4) strong arguments AGAINST: 
1) That independent central banks undermine the co-ordination, and hence the 
effectiveness of economic policy;  
2) That if controlling inflation is left to monetary policy exercised by a central 
bank the government has an incentive to pursue inflationary policies in other 
areas;  
3) That output-inflation tradeoffs are genuine political decisions, and should be 
under democratic control;  
4) That central banks are intrinsically conservative, and that politicians might 
disagree with central bankers about appropriate monetary policy without 
wanting to increase inflation.  
In my view the arguments against an independent central bank quite outweigh 
those in favour. 
 
 
 